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Abstract.  Many  pension  schemes  mandated  by  governments  have  accumulated  large  reserves.
The management  of these funds has a direct effect on financial sustainability and potential  benefit
levels.  It  also has  important  indirect  effects on  the  overall economy  when  the  funds are large.
Part  I of this  study  surveys  some  of the  available cross-country  evidence on  publicly-managed
pension  reserves.  We  find  that  publicly-managed  pension  funds (i) are  often  used to  achieve
objectives other  than  providing  pensions  (ii) are difficult to  insulate from  political interference
and  (iii) tend  to  earn  poor  rates  of  return  relative  to  relevant  indices.  These  findings  are
consistent  across countries  of all types,  but  returns  are especially dismal in countries  with  poor
governance.  The  experience to date suggests that the rationale for-prefunding have been seriously
undermined  by  public  management  of  pension  reserves.  Countries  with  serious  governance
problems should probably  avoid funding altogether.
*  Authors are Director, PrimAmerica  Consulting Services and Economist,  Social Protection  Unit, Human
Development  Network, World Bank, respectively.  Robert Holzmann,  Estelle James, Olivia Mitchell,
Sylvester  Schieber,  Yvonne  Sin and Juan Yermo  provided  useful  comments.TABLE OF  CONTENTS
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21. Introduction
Most governments force their citizens  to save for retirement.  In a pay-as-you-go
pension scheme, contributions are immediately used to pay current pensions.  Today, a
majority of publicly-mandated  pension schemes  are financed  this way.  In contrast, more
than fifty countries have built up reserves  to  cover some (partially funded) or all (fully
funded) of their pension liabilities. We estimate  that the stock of pension assets,  including
voluntary pensions, is now as much as 50 percent of world GDP.'
This figure is likely to increase  because more countries are choosing to prefund
their  pension obligations.  For example, Canada and Ireland have recently decided to
increase the  funding levels of their  partially funded public schemes.  Meanwhile, a
growing number of countries are including  privately managed  and funded schemes  as part
of their mandatory system. Management  of these reserves  is of vital importance  both to
the pension systems and the economies  involved.
Government  mandate  does  not  necessarily imply  government  management.
Countries increasingly  rely on private firms  to manage  the mandated contributions from
workers.  This does not mean that government  abdicates  any role over investment  policy.
Rather, there are usually many restrictions  on investment options. 2 In extreme situations,
regulations may be so heavy handed as to effectively  eliminate the discretion of private
managers.  Conversely, governments that directly control reserves may contract out
management to  the private sector or introduce some market based, objective criteria to
their  internal  investment policy.  In  other  words, government interference is more
usefully  thought of as a continuum rather than as a simple distinction between public and
private management.
The  influence of  government can be  harmful when  investment policies are
influenced by  objectives unrelated to  pension provision.  Low  investment returns
compromise the underlying rationale for prefunding by threatening the solvency of  a
defined benefit scheme or, in the case  of defined contribution schemes,  reducing  the risk
adjusted rate of return.  Poor performance  can also distort labor markets, as workers
increasingly perceive their  contributions to  these schemes as a tax.  Low risk-adjusted
returns  also signal an inefficient allocation of  a country's savings.  Conversely, good
management  can generate higher, more secure  benefits for members and provide positive
externalities  to the economy.
Often, if the fund is large enough,  there are important fiscal  policy ramifications.
Pension reserves are tempting sources of deficit financing,  a fact further encouraged by
methods  of  fiscal accounting.  This  source of  captive credit  may  lead to  increase
government consumption.  It can also be addictive; once a government builds this source
of borrowing into its budget process, it may be difficult to  wean it off and make the
necessary  reforms. This undermines  the underlying rationale  for funding.
These  are rough  estimates  based  on available  country  data. See  Palacios  and  Pallares  (2000).
2  See  Srinivas,  Whitehouse  and  Yermo  (2000).
3Yet, despite the high stakes involved, little has been written on the international
experience with managing  public pension reserves. Part I of this paper documents some
of  the  available evidence and makes a  preliminary  assessment of  the  international
experience. The next section distinguishes  between types of prefunding and public versus
private management  while the evidence  is reviewed  in Section 3. The last section of Part I
draws  some preliminary policy conclusions.  Part  II of this paper  looks at ways to
improve the governance  and incentives  for publicly-managed  pension funds and reviews
proposals in five OECD countries  that are attempting  to do so.
In Part I, we find that publicly-managed  funds almost always  face serious political
obstacles that  hamper  their  ability to  invest effectively.  Their  asset allocation is
systematically biased toward targeted investments and lending to  government at low
yields.  As a result, returns are much lower than those found in privately-managed  funds
and mostly lower than bank deposit  rates.
Using an index of governance  as an explanatory variable, we find that normalized
returns across  countries are positively  correlated with better government. Accounting for
this factor, we also find that private management generates significantly  better returns.
These results should be considered  preliminary.  Data is not strictly comparable and the
sample is small.  Nevertheless,  the empirical analysis supports the anecdotal evidence;
publicly-managed pension funds have not  been well managed.  In  many  countries,
especially those with  weak poor governance records, the  best policy may  be to  use
available resources to provide a safety net where traditional old age support systems have
started to unravel.
But most countries have already introduced forced savings schemes. If they are
still  running surpluses  they must find a way to manage  these funds.  A second best policy
would  try  to  minimize problems by introducing competition and accountability into
fund  management.  Competition  should  promote  good  investment  policies while
accountability  should  protect  members against fraud or  abuse.  Short  of  outright
privatization, some gains may be possible via competitive  tender.  Part II of this study
considers some recent initiatives  to contract out asset management  and put public pension
fund monies at arms' length from politicians.
42. Types of funding and management
2.1 Types  offunding of publicly-mandated  pensions
Publicly-mandated pension schemes with  some degree of  prefunding can  be
roughly grouped into three categories. The most common form is the partially  funded,
defined benefit  scheme.  These are often found in  younger countries where pension
schemes are still immature, as in Francophone Africa or the Middle East. 3 However, a
few older countries such as Sweden  and Japan also fall into this category. The extent to
which these  DB  schemes are actually funded varies across countries and over  time.
However,  to  our  knowledge, a fully funded  defined benefit plan run by  a national
government does not exist. 4
In  contrast,  the  second type is the  decentralized, defined contribution  (DC)
schemes that  are fully  funded in the sense that assets match liabilities at any  given
moment.5 Decentralized  and privately-managed DC schemes now operate in more than a
dozen countries  as part of multipillar pension  systems.  About  half are in Latin America,
but  recently  this  model  has spread to Hungary,  Poland  and Hong  Kong among others.
Australia,  Switzerland  and  the  United  Kingdom  are OECD  examples.  This  way  of
prefunding  publicly-mandated  pension  obligations  has become  more  prevalent over  the
last two  decades.
Finally,  the third  type of prefunded  scheme is centrally-managed and DC,  often
called provident  funds.  These are mostly found  in the former British colonies of Africa
and Asia.  Fewer than a dozen countries use this model and the number  is shrinking.  The
largest one  in  terms  of  membership  is the  Employees'  Provident  Fund  (EPF) in  India
with more  than 20 million  members.  The Central  Provident  Fund (CPF) of Singapore is
the best  known  however,  with  just over one  million  contributors.  Most prescribe  the
yield to  individual accounts every year and force investment in government  bonds.
International  data on funded pension  schemes are not  systematically collected  by
any single institution.  The figures in Table  1 compare the ratio of accumulated reserves
to  national  output  for  55 countries using various  sources documented  in Palacios  and
Pallares (2000).  Data  are from the late 1980s to mid 1990s and  are grouped according  to
the three categories mentioned above.
The concept of the "scaled  premium" -where reserves  are accumulated  in order to smooth out
contribution  rates over time  - was recommended by the International  Labor  Office and  adopted
in many developing  countries in the 1950s  and 1960s.  See  ILO (1983). Much of North Africa and
Francophone  sub-Saharan  Africa  adopted  the  scaled premium  approach.  Mesa-Lago  (1991)
reports nine  scaled premium  countries in Latin America.
4  There  is no  standard  methodology  for  calculating unfunded  public pension  liabilities  across
countries.  Nevertheless,  we believe this statement  to be true under  any  reasonable definition  of
full funding currently  applied to private sector defined benefit schemes.
Some of these schemes include guarantees or prescribed yields that are not funded.
5Table 1 Publicly-mandated pension fund reserves in selected  countries
by type offunding
Partially  funded  Centrally-managed  DC
Defined Benefit  (Provident  Funds)  Privately  managed  DC
(Percentage of GDP)
Egypt  33.1%  Malaysia  55.7%  Switzerland  117.0%
Sweden  32.0%  Singapore  55.6%  Netherlands  87.3%
Japan  25.0%  Sri Lanka  15.2%  UK  74.7%
Jordan  16.9%  Kenya  12.1%  Australia  61.0%
Mauritius  13.1%  Tanzania  9.4%  Chile  45.0%
Philippines  11.2%  Swaziland  6.6%  Denmark  23.9%
Gambia  11.1%  India  4.5%  Argentina  3.0%
Canada  11.0%  Nepal  4.0%  Colombia  2.9%
Belize  10.5%  Indonesia  2.8%  Peru  2.1%
Ghana  9.4%  Brunei  2.4%  Poland  1.1%
Morocco  8.7%  Zambia  0.7%  Uruguay  1.0%
Switzerland  7.1%  Uganda  0.6%  Bolivia  1.0%
Korea  7.0%  Mexico  0.5%
Tunisia  6.9%  Kazakstan  0.5%
Swaziland  6.6%  Hungary  0.4%
Jamaica  5.7%  El Salvador  0.3%
Costa Rica  5.4%  Croatia  . 0.0%
United  States  5.0%  Sweden  0.0%








Source:  Palacios and Pallares (2000).
Notes;  (1) The list does not include all countries known  to have reserves.  (2) Since 1995, India has
had both  a partially  funded DB scheme and a provident  fund.  (3) India and  Sri Lanka  also have
employer  managed  funds.  (4) Privately-managed  assets  in  column  three  may  include  some
voluntary  retirement  savings.
The  most  common  case - the  partially-funded,  DB  plan  - is shown  in  the  first
column.  The Swedish and Egyptian  schemes had accumulated  assets worth  almost  one
third  of GDP  by  the  mid-1990s.  Japan,  Mauritius,  Jordan  and  the  Philippines  also  have
accumulated  large funds  relative to  their  respective economies.  The  smallest  funds  in
countries  like Paraguay  or Yemen  had  assets equal to  less than  one  percent  of GDP.
6The countries in bold are those for which this ratio is likely to grow significantly
in the next few decades. For  example, projections for Korea suggest  that the  ratio of
reserves  to  GDP will more than double in just the next ten years.  Recent reforms in
Canada that raised contribution rates and aimed to increase returns should also lead to a
much higher level of funding over the  next two decades.  In other countries, such as
Japan, the funds will soon begin to dissipate  as the scheme matures and population ages.
The largest  provident funds relative to national income are those of Singapore  and
Malaysia. Their size is the result of four decades  of accumulation,  relatively  high coverage
and gradually rising contribution rates.  Most of the other provident funds in column 2
cover a minority of workers in each country helping explain why they are smaller by this
measure.  The fact that investment returns have trailed income growth is also partly to
blame (see  below).
Among the privately-managed  schemes in the third column, those of Australia,  the
Netherlands, Switzerland  and the UK are the largest in terms of assets. These multipillar
systems  were built on pre-existing voluntary private pension sectors. Among the others,
only  Chile has the  coverage levels and  a  long  enough history to  have accumulated
significant  assets. The rest of the Latin American countries in column three along with
the new schemes in Croatia, Hungary, Kazakstan, Poland and Sweden  are projected to
grow rapidly in the  next two  or three  decades.  For  example, accumulated funds in
Argentina, Hungary and Poland are each expected  to reach 40 percent of GDP by 2030.6
2.2 Public  versus  prinvate  management
The government  influences  the investment policies  of all funded pension schemes.
Private, voluntary pension funds rely on favorable tax treatment and are often subject  to
certain restrictions on investments and withdrawals. 7 Private managers  in  mandatory
schemes  sometimes  face an intrusive regulatory regime and often must obey strict limits
on the type of assets  that they can purchase.  Taken to  an extreme, portfolio limits can
severely  limit competition or choice in the market and may even be manipulated  to force
private funds to be invested exactly  as the government chooses.
At  the  same time,  a  centrally run  government  monopoly could use private
managers and  apply market  based criteria  to  their  selection and compensation.  As
documented in Part  II of this  study, some countries are trying to  build governance
mechanisms  that limit the direct role of politicians in the investment  process. In theory,
a  centrally managed fund  that  incorporates  market-based criteria could face a  less
restrictive environment  than a privately-managed  scheme  subject  to onerous regulations.
6  See  Rofman  and Stirparo  (1997)  for Argentina,  Palacios  and Rocha  (1998)  for Hungary and
Chlon,  Gora and  Rutkowski  (1999)  for  Poland.
7  See  Whitehouse  (1999)  on tax treatment  of funded pension  schemes.
7Given the range of possibilities,  it is more useful  to express  government's  potential
influence on  the  investment of  publicly-mandated pension funds along a continuum
rather than as a sharp and simplistic distinction between public and private management.
In Figure  1 below, the  possibilities range from the  direct control exerted by a state
monopoly to  a lightly regulated, private system where market forces are allowed to
operate freely. In Australia for example, government regulation  of investment of pension
funds is very light.  On the contrary, many countries fall closer  to the left hand side of
the circle (9 o'clock) where direct public management involves a parastatal monopoly.
There is no competition and government officials  determine investment  policy.
As we move from the laissez  faire point on the right towards direct control on the
left, the  level of government intervention  rises.  A clockwise shift represents stricter
government regulation of the  private sector.  Movement counterclockwise signals an
increase in the direct role of the government as manager of the funds.  In either case,
government influence  on investment decisions  increases.
Figure 1 Role of government  in management of pension reserves
Government  management  with
market-based  criteria
(Canada  - new  CPP  regime)
Direct  govemnment  Minimal  regulation  .of  privately-
management,  monopoly  managed,  decentralized
(Uganda)  (Australia)
"Draconian"  regulation  of
privately-managed,  decentralized
(Uruguay)
A "draconian" regulatory regime gives  government a large degree of control over
private managers. For example, some of the countries in the third column of Table 1
force private pension funds to invest a minimum share of their portfolios in government
bonds. 8 In  extreme cases where  discretion is practically non-existent, the  difference
8  The effect  of government  regulation  on the countries  in column  three of Table 1 are  discussed
in Srinivas,  Whitehouse  and Yermo  (1999).
8between direct control of asset allocation and indirect control through regulations can
disappear altogether. This is evident in the employer-based,  "exempt funds" of India that
are contracted out of the centrally-managed,  Employees' Provident Fund.  Until recently,
they have been  forced  to invest their entire portfolio in government guaranteed debt.
On the other hand, even in a centralized structure, the  government may set up
mechanisms  to limit political influence over investment decisions. It may, for example,
create an objective  benchmark based on some desired level of risk and target return  and
contract with private sector financial  institutions to manage  the assets. It may also subject
the  parastatal pension agency to the  same standards that are applied to  private sector
pension managers.
Most of the multipillar schemes including those in  Latin America and Eastern
Europe are privately-managed  and heavily regulated.  Here again there  are important
differences  in degree; in Figure 1, Chile and Argentina would fall somewhere between
Uruguay and Australia (say, at 4 o'clock) because  they are less restricted than the former
and more restricted  than the latter.  Most of the countries listed in the first two columns
of Table 1 lie closer to the left side of the circle.  This may be changing; recently, for
example, Singapore  and Fiji have allowed some members  to pick private managers and to
determine how a portion of their Central Provident Fund balance  will be invested. 9
The  case of  Bolivia  provides  another  classification challenge.  There  the
government split the pension market into two  regional monopolies and auctioned the
management rights to private consortia.  Eventually, the exclusive concession will end;
new firms will be allowed  to enter the market and workers to switch between them.  This
is an example of introducing private sector management  while retaining direct control
over the degree of competition.  A similar outcome could have been achieved by tight
regulation  of  the  conditions  for  entry  into  the  market  (e.g., minimum  capital
requirements, minimum membership  etc.).
These examples illustrate the  point  that  all countries lie  somewhere along a
continuum of government involvement in  managing pension reserves.  Regulation can
influence investment  just as much as direct control.  Or put another way, decentralized
management  does not ensure more freedom of investment decision. In practice however,
regulatory constraints are rarely so extreme as to  eliminate the  discretion of private
managers while most public pension monopolies do not restrain themselves in order to
reduce political interference.  The remainder of Part I focuses on the experience to date
with the DB schemes  and provident funds found in the first two columns of Table 1.
See  Asher  (1999)  on Singapore  and  http://fiji.gov.fJ  for information  on Fiji.
93.  International  experience  with public management  of pension reserves
This section looks at the experience of governments or parastatal institutions that
manage  pension reserves around the world.  After a brief discussion of how these funds
are governed,  we turn to investment policies and observed portfolios.  The implications
of our findings  are then highlighted.
3.1 Governance  structure
Provident funds  and social insurance agencies typically have boards that  set
investment  policy. These boards are almost always "tripartite" with representatives from
labor unions, employers and the government. Sometimes  pensioners are also represented.
In 25 countries where  information was available, only  three  did not  have tripartite
boards." 0 Chairmen are typically appointed by the government and usually come from
the Ministry of Finance or the ministry responsible  for pension policy.  The Treasury or
Central Bank often plays a leading role.  The Swedish  case described in Box 1 is a good
example.
While the  board  may  determine  overall  investment  policy  (subject to  the
constraints described in the next section), an investment committee is often responsible
for more detailed decisions  and monitoring and evaluating the investments of the fund,
trading, valuation etc."  Most schemes do  everything in-house.  We  found only  four
countries that had used external asset managers  and in these cases,  the proportion of the
portfolio involved was minimal. In some partially-funded  DB schemes, an actuarial unit
performs  funding assessments.  A few countries use external actuaries.
The composition of boards reflect domestic  political circumstances. For example,
in  Korea the  composition of the  Committee for National  Pension Fund  Operation
(NPFO) was changed in 1998  as part of a reform of the National Pension Scheme (NPS).
The Minister of Health replaced  the Minister of Finance as chairman and the number of
members was increased from 11 to  20.  The members include the  vice Ministers of
Finance, Agriculture, Industry, and  Labor, the  President  of  the  National  Pension
Corporation (which administers  the NPS), three employer and employee representatives
respectively,  six representatives of farmers, fishermen and the  self-employed and two
pension  experts.
The changes reflected two  recent developments.  First, the  shift  of ministerial
power was due to broader decline  of the standing of the Ministry of Finance in the wake
of the East  Asian financial  crisis. The addition of new members of the insured population
and employer  representatives  reflects  the expansion  of coverage  to new groups such as the
self-employed  in 1999.
The following  figures  on the number  of Board  members  were compiled  from national  sources:
India  (42),  Jordan  (15),  Korea  (20),  Malaysia  (20)  and  Sweden  (9),  Tanzania  (12),  Kenya  (10).
The following  figures  on the number of staff handling  investments  were compiled  from
national  sources:  Ghana (11),  Kenya  (62),  Malaysia  (6),  Nigeria  (12),  Sudan  (62),  Uganda  (6) and
Zambia  (21).
10Box 1 Sweden's  AP funds
Six  pension funds are under public management  in Sweden. The  largest  by far are the first  three that share the
following  features:
The board of each fumd  consists of nine members:  funds 1, 2, and 3 inctude members  from local government
and municipalities,  unions, employer  organizations,  consumer  organizations  and individuals  representing  the
self-employed  as well as representatives appointed by  the government.  The govenment  appoints the
chairman  of the fund boards. In voting on issues, a majority  nrle is followed. If the board is equally divided
on an issue,  the chairman  casts the deciding  vote. (The  minority  opinion should  be noted). The government
sets compensation  to the board members.  The fund board can employ staff needed and decide on their
compensation.  Administrative  costs are paid by the funds. The fund  board has to report  to the government  on
an annual basis. The following  table shows  the portfolio  composition  of these three fimds  at the end of 1997.
Composition  of funds  1-3  as of Dec 31,1997
Percent  of total
Govermnent  bonds  42
Housing  bonds  40
Other bonds  7
Other interest-eaning  6
Foreign  bonds  I
Real estate  4
Funds 4-6 are substantially  smaller than funds 1-3 and there are rules governing  how many assets  they can
accumulate. Funds 4 and 5 each have 14 members  on their boards,  they have representatives  from employer
organizations,  unions, municipalities  and consumer  organizations.  The  board of fund  #6 has 5 members,  all of
which are appointed by the govemment. These funds invest in domestic  and international  equities and the
latter  cannot be more  than 10  percent of assets.
* Based on Sunden (1999).
It  is not  always  clear  how  the  composition  of the  Board  affects investment  policy.
In the case of Korea, the  Ministry  of Finance had been able to tap the NPS surpluses for
the last decade to finance projects and public works.  After the  "reforms", the Ministry  of
Health  and the new worker  representatives may have other uses for these funds.
Sometimes, the composition  and operating procedures of the Board are irrelevant.
For example, in Malaysia during the East Asian financial crisis the Mahathir  government
used the Employees'  Provident  Fund  to  support  certain government  projects against the
objections  of  the  Board  of  Trustees." 2 Another  example  is  found  in  Munnell  and
Ernsberger (1989) who note that the US Secretary of the Treasury,  when constrained  by a
debt ceiling in  1985, ordered  the  conversion  '...of  28 billion  dollars in  long term  bonds
held by the trust  funds into non-interest  bearing cash balances without  notifying the two
public trustees."  More  often, however,  government control  is assured through  political
appointments  and the direct  representation  of the Executive branch on the Board.
l  See,  "Savings  at Risk:  Malaysia  is being criticized  for using its national pension fund to funnel
cash to  companies",  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  April  30,  1998.
*  ~~~~113.2 Restrictions and mandates
These governing bodies are often constrained by the legal framework  and/or  by a
set  of  investment  principles.  Their  discretion  is limited  by restrictions  on  investment
choices and by mandates  to invest in certain projects.  In Korea for example, a law passed
in the late 1980s, automatically  channeled two thirds of the National  Pension Fund to the
Ministry  of Finance  (MOF) in the form of special loans.  In other countries, including the
United  States, all monies must be invested in non-marketable government  bonds.
Table 2 shows  the portfolio  restrictions of the Employees Provident  Fund  (EPF)
in India.  These refer to new investments as opposed to  limits on the actual portfolio  held
at any  given time.  Notably,  90 percent  of investments  must be made in government  or
government  guaranteed  debt  with  only  10 percent  allowed  to  be  invested  in  private
corporate  bonds  with  investment  grade  rating.  Prior  to  1998,  even  this  limited
investment  in the private  sector was not allowed.  Interestingly, the EPF board  has thus
far  decided  not  to  invest  in the  corporate  bonds despite higher potential  returns.  This
decision was apparently  due to  the risk aversion of union  representatives combined  with
the practice of stipulating the annual minimum yield in advance." 3
Table 2  Prescribed investment limits for the EPF in India,  1998
Instrument  % of amount  invested
(i)  Central  government  bonds  25
(ii)  (a) State government  bonds
15
(b) Government  guaranteed  bonds
(iii) (a) Securities  of Public Financial  Institutions
Public Sector  Enterprises,  Banks  and
Infrastructure  Development  Finance  Co.
40
(b) CDs issued  by public  sector  banks
(iv)  Above  three categories  as determined  20
by Board  of Trustees
(v)  Private  sector  bonds  with investment  grade  10
credit rating  from two credit  rating  agencies
(from (iv) above)
Source:  EPF  Act as amended  1998.
13  Discussions with  EPF  officials in November  1998.
12But mandates and restrictions are not always  so explicit. They can also take the
form of investment principles or  guidelines  that steer the portfolio toward social and
economic  development objectives. Guidelines  in Mauritius  provide that 30 percent of the
portfolio should be invested in areas with a "social  dimension" and even specified  the
acceptable  loss of return from this type of investment." 4 And among  the major principles
guiding  Jordan's public pension scheme  is:
"Contributing  to  the development  of the productive  base of the national economy
through participation  in economically  feasible  projects  that, at the same  time, have an
appropriate  developmental  dimension."
(Social  Security  Corporation  Annual  Report,  1996)
The expression 'developmental dimension"  opens the door to  a wide array of
possibilities, which probably explains why politicians find them convenient.  "Social
investments" for example, are justified on the basis that they will improve the lives of
members of the  scheme in  ways other than receiving a pension. Personal loans for
housing and education, subsidies to  mortgage markets and housing construction and
investment in social  infrastructure (hospitals,  clinics)  are common  examples.
Economic or  development objectives give rise to  another  kind  of  mandate -
"economically-targeted  investments"  or ETIs. Some  proponents of this type of investment
claim that  inefficiencies in  the  capital markets leave worthwhile projects without
financing and that there  are externalities  to some  projects that can produce quantifiable
benefits for members. However, such claims  are difficult  to substantiate  as are the market
failures that proponents claim exist."  More often  the motives for ETIs are related  to the
popularity of the projects being financed.  We are not aware of any country where
rigorous and objective criteria are applied to the selection  of these targeted investments.
Anecdotally, the selection of projects appears  to be based mostly on the priorities of the
government in power.  In this case,  the lower returns  that typically  accompany  ETIs are a
tax on at least some members of the scheme.
Examples of economically targeted investments (ETIs) of pension funds can be
found in every region and in countries of every income level. This can take place at a
very  broad  policy level.  Public pension funds in  five African countries responded
positively when asked if there was a formal link between the government's economic
development plan and the use of pension  reserves.' 6 Mahdi (1990)  reports that in Turkey,
the State Planning Board can directly intervene  in investment policy.  In Jordan, the
Board that manages investments tries to "meet criteria, which include those established
within the framework of the National Development  Plan".
14  "The  yield  to investments  with a social  dimension  is expected  to be 2.5%  above  the bank rate
and  commercial  bank loans  are  expected  to yield  4.5%  above  the Bank  rate."
15  For examples  of the debate  over ETIs in the US, see  Watson  (1994)  and Nofsinger  (1998).
Munnell  and  Sunden  (1999)  provide  a long list  of examples  from  the US  experience.
16  ISSA (1997).
13Pension funds are often directed  toward infrastructure  projects or state enterprises.
In Venezuela,  for example, a substantial  portion of the pension fund portfolio during the
1980s was invested in  state enterprise bonds.  In  Tunisia, the  government required
investment in  "equipment bonds".'  Egyptian and Moroccan reserves are  invested
through  development banks.  Since 1987,  Iran's reserves have been used among other
things to  provide  "financial facilities to  industrial units of the  country,  to  buy raw
materials and machinery and improving business activities".'" Whatever the merits of
these investments, all appear  to have generated  below market rates of return.
In East Asia, ETIs have been used extensively  by publicly-managed  pension funds.
In Japan for example, a portion of the surpluses  are transferred to a Trust Fund Bureau
that in turn makes them available  to the Fiscal Investment Loan Program (FILP).  Under
the  direction of  the  Ministry  of  Finance, this  agency invests in  hospitals, housing,
infrastructure projects, resorts and welfare facilities.  Korea has followed the Japanese
model closely.  As in Japan, a substantial  portion of the reserves  have been leant to the
Ministry of Finance which in  turn  has used these funds to  invest in  various public
projects.  This portion has grown to more than two thirds of the total portfolio.  These
funds also make social investments. The category  labeled "welfare"  has risen from zero to
about 3 percent of the portfolio in Korea and was 17 percent in Japan by 1995.19
Government  mandates are most popular for the purpose of providing housing.
Investments by pension funds in this sector can take many forms.  A government might
force the pension fund to purchase mortgage bonds in an effort to create a market for
such instruments.  Alternatively, the  pension fund  could provide loans directly to
members for construction or purchase of housing. It could also invest in public housing
projects through special  bonds or loans  to developers.
Sweden provides an example. In the 1960s  and 70s, the Swedish  government was
interested  in  expanding housing  opportunities.  Growing public  pension  reserves
presented a convenient source of long term financing.  This match was made when the
Central Bank effectively  forced the public pension funds (or AP funds) to purchase low
interest housing bonds. As a result, note Munnell and Ernsberger (1989),  "...the priorities
of the AP managers were often at odds with the  goals of the  Central Bank". 20 The
pension fund managers lost the battle and the AP funds earned  lower returns in order to
meet the government's housing policy objectives.
In Jordan,  housing projects which "meet the needs of medium and low income
families"  were favored and interest rates  on these loans "are below prevailing  interest rates
on normal deposits".  Social  investments are also reported in Algeria, Iran, Tunisia and
Morocco, mostly in the form of investments  in  housing and medical facilities.  Vittas
17  Vittas  (1993)  states  that these  restrictions  were  being  lifted  in the early  1990s.
18 SSRI  (1997)  p. 76.
19  The Employees'  Pension  Insurance  and  the National  Pension  System  have  63%  of their funds
in national  financial  investments  and loans  programs,  17%  in welfare  operations,  and 20%  in
market-based  investments  (24  trillion  in 1998).  .
21  Munnell  and Ernsberger  (1989).
14(1993) reports that social housing investments  were being phased out in the early 1990s  in
Tunisia but were being replaced by housing and personal  loans at below market interest
rates.  In Iran,  the  annual  report  of the  social insurance  agency cites housing loans to
cooperatives and  individuals  between  1987 and  1993.21 Algeria's  pension  funds were
invested in social infrastructure  projects yielding negative returns.'
Housing was also found to be the most popular social investment in a recent study
of a dozen Anglophone  African countries.  ISSA (1997) reports  that  the public pension
funds in  Gambia, Ghana,  Kenya, Mauritius,  Nigeria,  Swaziland,  Tanzania, Uganda and
Zambia played a role in housing finance  and/or  construction.  In  Tanzania and Zambia
for example, the fund itself constructs housing which is then rented to individuals.
Sometimes these  loans are not  directed  at the  average worker.  In Nigeria, for
example, housing  investments  "are  restricted  to  the  provision  of commercial housing
largely  for  high  net  worth  individuals",  although  it  was  noted  that  the  fund  was
"considering the  development  of mass housing  for  middle  and  low  income persons in
urban  areas" (ISSA (1997)). In Tanzania, as described below in Box 2, housing is provided
to privileged individuals including the Prime Minister.
Box 2 The  house  that the Tanzanian Provident  Fund built
In  November  1998,  Tanzania's  parastatal  Pension  Fund  commissioned
PriceWaterHouseCoopers  to  review  its  investment portfolio  and  fnancial  planning and
management  and advise it on fiuture  activities. The inquiry followed  the revelation  that contrary
to earlier denials by the press secretary, Prime Minister Sumaye publicly admitted  to having
borrowed  50 million Tsh (about 75,000 US$) to construct his third house.  Another  powerful
official  receiving  a similar  loan  was Dr. Idris Rashidi,  governor  of the Bank of Tanzania  who  was
recently  replaced  after completing  his term. Several  private  firms received  questionable  bans .
The National  Social  Security  Fund (NSSF)  collects  contributions  from public  and  private
sector workers but exempts  politicians  and high government  officials  In addition  to personal
loans, in recent years it has invested in  huge residential'  and commercial buildings  despite
financial  guidelines from the central bank requiring that social security funds to be used to
purchase  liquid  assets.
The Drector General,  Mr Mataka said the fund had stopped giving out loans  awaiting
the results  of the PriceWaterHouseCoopers  evaluation.  The fund, he said,  would stick  to  treasury
bills  and  government  deposits.
Source:  News  report by Premy  Kibanga,  Dar es Salaam,  November  25, 1998.
21  Social Security Research Institute, Iran (1997).
Boersch-Supan et. al., (1999).
15Restrictions  and mandates can also be used to force pension  funds to lend money
to the government.  Governments  prefer to borrow  from public pension  funds for at least
three  reasons.  First, the flow of pension  fund surpluses is usually predictable, making it
easier to finance anticipated  deficits.  Second, by forcing  the pension  funds to  purchase
non-tradable bonds with  no transparent  market  pricing  mechanism, the government may
be able to reduce its borrowing  costs.  Finally, fiscal accounting practices may reward this
form  of  borrowing  since purchase of  government  securities  by  a  public  pension  fund
reduces net government  debt. 23 Many countries  apply rules that  explicitly or implicitly
force public pension fund  managers to purchase government  bonds.  In some cases, such
as the United States, this is the only investment  allowed.
Figure 2 summarizes  the type of mandates  and  restrictions  that  were found in  a
sample of more than  30 countries.  In each, some portion  of the portfolio  was directed to
either  ETIs,  social investments  or to the purchase of government  or state enterprise debt.
Housing was the most popular type of directed investment.
Figure 2 Directed investment  of publicly-managed pension funds





One of aboe 
0%  20%  40%  60%  80%  100%
NM = non-marketable  government debt.
Source: authors' calculations  based  various country sources.
23  The  IMF's GFS Statistics  methodology  treats the purchase of government bonds by public
pension funds  as repurchase of government  debt.
163.3  Ltmited domestic investment options
In  addition  to  the constraints  imposed by  governments,  underdeveloped  capital
markets  and shallow financial sectors can be a major obstacle for pension fund managers,
be  they  public  or  private.  While  allowing  for  investment  abroad  would  ease this
constraint  (and is generally to  be recommended),  it is often  not  an option  because of
exchange  controls,  high  transaction  costs,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  political
pressure to keep scarce investment funds at home.
Figures  3 and 4 use stock market  capitalization and  commercial bank  credit to
GDP  to  highlight  the wide variation in the depth  of financial sectors across countries. 24
Not  surprisingly, the countries with the lowest ratios are found in sub-Saharan Africa and
the  poorer  parts of the former Soviet Union.  Pension fund managers .in these countries
would  encounter  few  options for investment  in domestic  markets.  They  are also the
countries  with  the  weakest  legal  and  regulatory  structures,  thinnest  market  for
government  bonds  and the most limited  human resources for operation  and  supervision
of funded pension schemes.
Figure  3 Distribution  of countries  by financial  sector depth
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Source: World Development  Indicators  1997,  Table 5.10.
24  Other indicators such as M3/GDP, stock market capitalization  and liquidity  etc. produce a
similar cdistribution  across  countries.
17Figure 4 Distribution  of countries by financial sector depth
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C:learly, public pension  fund  managers  in  different  countries  face very  different
constraints.  Sometimes options  in the  domestic market  are practically  non-existent.  In
some  countries,  die  rule  of  law,  definition  of  property  rights  and  basic  financial
infrastructure  do  not  meet  minimum  standards.  In  such  a  situation,  the  riskless
benchmark  does not exist since the government  may default on its bonds or fail to ensure
the solvency of the banking  system.  Unfortunately,  the case of Cameroon,  described in
Box 3, is not unique.
But  even  in  countries  where  domestic  capital  markets  do  provide  potential
investment outlets for large public pension  funds, at least three  obvious problems  emerge:
First,  ownership of a large proportion  of the shares by the government  would  effectively
nationalize the industries involved.  At  the very least, it would  raise important  questions
regarding  corporate  governance.  Second,  the  government  may  be tempted  to  use the
pension  fund  to  support  the  stock  market  or  to  support  specific  firms  with  political
influence. 25 Finally, the government  may find itself in the awkward  position  of regulator
and owner of certain industries, creating other possible of conflicts  of interest.  These are
among the  major challenges facing supporters  of the  idea of  investing  public  funds in
private markets. 26
0~~~~~
25  Recent examples  include the questionable  purchases of banks in the Philippines (Wall Street
Journal, July 3, 1999)  and the use of Taiwan's state controlled pension fund to prop up the stock
market (Wall street Journal, July 19, 1999).
26  see  Angelis  (1998)  for  a good  review  of the  issues in the  us  context.
18Box 3 Cameroon  - no  safe haven for public pension  funds*
In the 1980s, the public pension fund in Cameroon  (CNPS)  had a difficult time finding
safe places  to invest its growing  funds. There  were few private  securities  available  domestically.
It was forced to  purchase medium term,  low interest bonds from the National Investment
Company  and invested  some  more in the Bank for Trade and Industry  but all of this accounted  for
only  a small  part of the overall  portfolio.
Bank deposits were  the second largest item in the portfolio  but these deposits  tuned out
to be quite risk5.  The accounts  were frozen when several  banks were closed in the 1980s. A
small part of the portfolio  was in real estate. This provided  rental income  and appeared  to have
maintained  its real value over  time.
But the  largest part of the  portfolio was held  in the form of governnent bonds.
Naturally,  it would be safe there. Or would it?  In the mid-1980s,  the government  of Cameroon
covered  part of its burgeoning  deficit by borrowing  large sums  from the CNPS. More loans  were
mandated  to state enterprises  like the Cameroon  Sugar Corporation  and the Cameroon  Banana
Organization. Social housing was financed through loans to the Cameroon  Housing Company.
These loans were made upon the instruction of the President  of the Republic  or the Minister  of
Finance  while  the CNPS  management  was restricted  to carrying  out instructions. The duration  of
the loans was 10 or 20 years and the interest rates were often lower than those given on bank
deposits. Some state companies  were unable to repay the loans  while others  simply chose  not to
repay. One  official expressed  his dismay,
"The managers  of the CNPS  have no real means of exerting  pressure  on the govemment  since  the
Fund is a public establishment... This situation  justifies the fears of those who worry that the
temptation  of the abundant  reserves accumulated  by social  security  schemes  will be too strong  for
public authorities,  which will  draw on them for  more dubious  purposes."
Frustrated  managers  at the CNPS even advocated  depositing  some of the pension fund
money abroad  but this was rejected by the govemment. In the end, there seems to be no safe
haven for the savings  of Cameroon's  workers.
Source: This  material  is drawn  from Mounbaga  (1995).
3.4 Observed Portfolios
Table  2 reports  broad  portfolio  allocations  for public  pension  schemes in  more
than  thirty  countries  from  every  region  of  the  world.  The  data come  from  various
sources  and  the original  categories were  reclassified into  four  broad  asset classes.  The
share  in  each category  is rounded.
Clearly,  there  is  a  bias  in  most  countries  toward  holding  large  shares  in  bank
deposits  and  government  securities.  For  the sample  as a whole, the  simple average of
holdings in this category  is 75 percent  of total  assets. In most of these cases, there is little
or  no  secondary  market  for  the  government  bonds  that  are  being  held  by  the  pension
fund.  Most  of the bank  deposits  are in  state-owned  banks.
19Only five countries invest less than half of the public  pension fund in this asset.
These countries - Ecuador, Philippines, Sweden,  Sudan  and Tunisia - have above average
holdings of loans for housing and other purposes.  This is the second most popular
category for investments. Loans were significant  in nineteen of the countries and there is
no obvious pattern  by income level or region.  The majority of these loans are made
outside  the formal financial  system and involve implicit  subsidies.
The last column includes property such as hotels, commercial  office  space  and land
along with some other items, which were not easily classified. Nineteen countries had
some investments in these items, but with the exception of four countries, never more
than one fifth of the portfolio.  Typically, these transactions  involve long term ownership
in an illiquid real estate market making valuation extremely difficult.  Again, no clear
pattern held with regard to the proportions of real estate  held.
Table 2 illustrates the very limited use of private capital  markets by public pension
funds. The least popular investment is in equities. Only about one third of the countries
had any investment in this category.  On average  only three percent of the portfolios in
the sample are invested in shares.  The size and liquidity of the stock market is not
necessarily  the constraint, as low equity holdings are not correlated with these indicators.
For example,  Korea had a relative large and liquid stock market but has chosen to invest
less  than three percent of pension reserves  in equities. Similarly,  the absence  of shares in
US  and  Canadian  portfolios  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  domestic capital market
conditions.  Certainly, thin  local capital markets in  many countries could discourage
pension fund managers, especially if foreign investment were prohibited.  It is doubtful
however,  that it was a binding constraint in most cases.
Private  pension  investment  patterns  in  the  1980s and  90s were significantly
different. A  recent study of  10 OECD  countries found that the  unweighted average
proportion  of  private  pension  portfolios invested in  equity in  1996 was around  32
percent.  Weighted by  assets, the  figure rises to  almost 50 percent. 27 Investments in
equities in  Latin America's new private pension schemes also tend to  be significantly
higher than what is observed in Table 2.  Private pension  funds  in Peru and Argentina for
example,  held 22 and 35 percent of their respective  assets  in equities in mid-1997. Since
restrictions on  equity  investments were lifted in  the  mid-1980s,  Chilean AFPs have
increased  investments in shares to about 30 percent by mid-1997. Around three-fourths
of Hong Kong's private pension assets were in the form of equities between 1990-1995.
We are not aware of social investment mandates or ETIs in private pension systems.
27  See  table  V.5, OECD (1998).  This average  includes  Australia,  Belgium,  Canada,  France,  Italy,
Japan,  Germany,  Netherlands,  Switzerland,  the United  Kingdom  and  the United  States.
20Table  3 Publicly-managed  pension  fund  portfolios  in 34 countries,  1980s and  1990s
Govmt. Bonds/  Loans/Mortgages/  Sharesl  Real Estate/Other  Total
Country  Year  Fixed Deposits  Housing Bonds  Equity
percentages
Canada(CPP)  1991  100  0  0  0  100
Egypt  1995  100  0  0  0  100
Pakistan  1981  100  0  0  0  100
Sri Lanka  1997  100  0  0  0  100
Switzerland  1997  100  0  0  0  100
United States  1997  100  0  0  0  100
Yemen  1996  100  0  0  0  100
Colombia  1982  100  0  0  0  100
India  1995  100  0  0  0  100
Venezuela  1981  100  0  0  0  100
Niger  1980  96  3  1  0  100
Senegal  1980  93  6  1  0  100
Jamaica  1987  91  9  0  0  100
Tanzania  1996  90  0  0  10  100
Korea  1997  89  3  - 3  6  100
Rwanda  1980  82  4  5  8  100
Ethiopia  1996  80  0  0  20  100
Costa Rica  1987  79  15  0  6  100
Burundi  1981  78  9  6  8  100
Peru  1988  76  7  0  17  100
Kenya  1994  73  0  11  16  100
Uganda  1994  68  8  1  23  100
Japan  1995  63  17  19  0  100
Malaysia  1996  63  21  15  1  100
Togo  1981  59  1  3  37  100
Morocco  1994  58  32  7  3  100
Cameroon  1989  57  40  2  1  100
Mauritius  1996  56  0  2  42  100
Jordan  1995  52  25  17  6  100
Philippines  1995  44  38  10  8  100
Tunisia  1990  43  30  0  27  100
Sweden  1996  42  40  0  18  100
Sudan  1982  26  58  0  16  100
Ecuador  1986  10  83  3  3  100
Mean  75  14  3  8  100
Source: Palacios  and Pallares  (2000).
Note: Provident funds in bold.
As already noted,  investment  abroad by public pension funds is rare.  We found
only a few countries  where foreign securities were held by public pension funds including
Japan  (< 1%), Mauritius  (5%) and  Sweden (2%).  A  1997 legislative change allowed the
main public scheme in the Philippines to invest up to 7.5 percent abroad, but this had not
occurred  by  1999.28  This  is  poor  policy  in  light  of the  limited  investment  options
available in most  countries  and  especially when  the funds are large relative to  domestic
28  In fact, the finance mninister  recently announced  that no foreign  investments  would be allowed.
21capital markets.  Nevertheless,  the political pressure to keep workers savings at home is a
constant theme  in the policy debates of rich and poor countries alike. 29
In  contrast,  data for  seven OECD  countries  (including some voluntary  schemes)
show that  private  pension  funds  have increased the  average share  of their  portfolio  in
foreign assets from  12 to  17 percent  between  1990 and  1996.3° This trend  is likely  to
continue and restrictions  on cross-border  investments by pension funds have already been
relaxed in many OECD  countries.
3.5 Investment returns and volatility
Perhaps  the  most  important  single indicator  of how  public pension  reserves are
being managed  is the  rate  of  return.  Unfortunately,  data are not  readily  available for
most  countries  and  where  they  are,  may  not  be  strictly  comparable.  For  example,
valuation methods  vary,  with  most  countries using book values rather  than  marking  to
market.  In  other  countries,  returns  are  simply  not  published.  The  dearth  of  good
information  in  this  area  is  itself  symptomatic  of  the  lack  of  accountability  and
transparency  that characterize  many of the schemes (see Box 4).
With  these caveats  in  mind,  this  subsection looks  at two  types  of returns  for  a
small sample  of  countries.  The  first  type  is the  return  credited  to  the  accounts  of
provident  fund  members.  The  second  refers to  the reported  return  on investments  of
partially  funded,  defined  benefit  schemes.  Countries  with  data  for  at  least  eight
consecutive years were included  in the sample (see Annex 1).
Figure  5 below  plots  the  annual  compounded  rates of return  for  a sample  of 22
countries  for  different  time  periods  against the standard  deviations  of annual  returns.
Half of the  sample or  10 countries  failed to  generate positive real returns.  For those  that
did, returns  were low, mostly  between  1-2 percent.  Only members of provident  funds in
Malaysia and the partially  funded,  defined benefit scheme in Korea earned real- returns  in
excess of three  percent.  The Korean  performance was the best at 5.4 percent  per annum.
The worst returns  were found in Uganda  (-50.5%),  Peru (46.6%), and Zambia (-30.5%).
29  For example,  proposals  for  the  new Investment  Board to  allow the  CPP to  invest as much
abroad  as private pension funds (20%)  have been hotly contested by Canadian  unions.
3  The sample did not include Australia where pension funds tend to hold more than 15 percent
in foreign  assets.
22Box  4 Morocco's CNSS at the Center of a Conflict
The head of one of Morocco's  biggest labor union, the UMT, is requiring Prime Minister Youssoufi  to
answer  some tough questions  regarding the country's social  security fimd known as CNSS. In a letter
sent  to the head of the government,  Mahjoub  Benseddik  of the UMT labor union said that he wanted
answers  on three  main questions. These questions  are:
"What  were  the losses incurred  by CNSS  members  due  to the mismanagement  of the CNSS  over  the last
20 years?" 'Who is responsible  for this mismanagement  and how will this/these person(s) be liable in
court  and  what the government  intends  to do again  this/these  person(s)?  "How the government  intends  to
give  back  control  of the CNSS  to its legitimate  contributors?"
In his letter, Benseddik reminds Prime Minister Youssoufi  that "since 1983 it was his organization
(UMT)  that was constantly  protesting  against the abuse  of power with total impunity  by representatives
of the central  government"  Between 1978  and 1992,  Benseddik  calculates  that 'subscbers  to the CNSS
have  lost  some DH 20 biTlion."  In his letter  he enclosed  a file containing  various reports  of "dilapidation
of workers  wealth."
Mr. Benseddik  gives indeed  a concrete  example on what he considers  is "workers' wealth dilapidation."
One example  is the "illegal agreement secretly signed in 1988" by the two ministers overseeing the
CNSS,  the ministers of finance  and public health. The agreement  was about the health clinic network
owned by the CNSS which was "illegally" taken over by  the government.  For Benseddik, this
unacceptable  transfer caused  tremendous damages in fnancial and technical terms to the CNSS and
hence  to its members.
The Secretary General of the UMT7,  Mr. Benseddik, reminds Youssoufi that it was the mismanagement of
the CNSS that led his organization  to withdraw from the  Fund's Executive Board in  1993.  Mr.
Benseddik  goes further as to demand  from Mr. Youssoufi  all the financial  documents,  accountmg  audits,
and other  investigative  reports  made by experts  of the International  Labor  Union since 1992 as regard  to
the Fund. The goal, Wr. Benseddik  says, "is to let the public opinion  know, in a very precise manner,
who is responsible,  who embezzled  funds,  and who got  rich as a consequence."
Observers  say that Mr. Benseddik's  remarks and demands  are somehow  unjustified. His organization,
the BMT, is the principal labor  union affiliate  to the CNSS. As a Board  member, the UMT has always
had the right to question  and  review every aspects  of the management  of the Fund and could have made
changes  if it found  that something  was wrong. In fact, the UMT labor union withdrew  from the CNSS
board in 1993,  when the government  requested  that other  labor unions,  the UGTM and CDT, have a seat.
The UMT had then 8 seats. With the arrival in power  of a govenunent of 'alternation' led by a Prime
Minister  afffilated  to a rival union, the UMT sees its position  at high risk. It has recently been angered
by the issue  of representation  to the ILO's international  meeting in Geneva. Youssoufi asked the three
main unions  to come  up with a single representation  but Benseddik  did not approve of such request since
he has been  the only  representative  of Morocco  for decades.
For Youssoufi,  this is an opportunity  to fix the CNSS'  problems. It is time that the CNSS  problems
are solved  in total  transparency  and now Youssoufi  has  the opportunity  to do so.
Source:  reprinted  from North  Africa News  website.
23A  striking  feature  of  Figure  5  is that  volatility,  as  measured  by  the  standard
deviation  of annual  returns,  is inversely  related  with  the  average  compounded  return.
Given  that  the  data  are  from  different  countries  and  years,  they  do  not  represent  a
comparable set of points  along a risk-return frontier.  Nevertheless,  we would expect that
cross country  results  would  be  roughly  consistent  with  the  ideas that  higher  risk  is
rewarded by higher returns.  This  is not the case.  Instead, half of the  sample hold risky
portfolios  and gets dismal returns.  The other  half get low  but  stable returns.  We also
report  the  returns  for  Chile  for  private  pension  industry  between  1982 and  1997 as
reported  in Srinivas and Yermo (1999).
Figure  5 Annual, compounded,  real returns and volatility
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Source:  Author's  calculations based on data in Palacios and Pallares (2000).
Figure  5  is  difficult  to  interpret.  Except  for  a  truly  international  portfolio,
risk/return  profiles  of  the  investments  available  to  public  pension  funds  vary  greatly
across countries.  Public pension managers in each country  had to deal with  available rates
of return  in their  respective economies.  Recent  evidence suggests that  these may be low
even  in  capital-scarce  countries.3'  Mandates  and  restrictions  further  constrain  the
opportunity  set.  Finally, country  specific factors affecting particular  economy  during the
period covered  here could skew the  results.  In  short,  while  Figure  4 confirms  low or
negative returns  for all of the publicly-managed  schemes, it does not  reveal whether the
returns experienced were reasonable given prevailing conditions.
Easterly (1999)  for example,  finds very low returns to capital in Sub-Saharan  Africa.
24In order to get a clearer picture, we looked at the returns relative  to bank deposit
rates in the same countries during the same periods. Normalizing  in this way should help
control for some of the  country-specific factors and provide a crude benchmark for
investment  alternatives. Figure 6 shows the difference  between  pension fund returns and
short-term bank  deposit rates for 20 countries.  There was a  very high correlation
between the  rates of return on pension funds and the bank deposit rate.  This is not
surprising  given the high shares of the portfolio that are invested  in'  bank deposits  and/or
short term government bonds and the effect of inflation  on both.
Figure 6 Difference between annual compounded  real publicly-managed
pension  fund returns and bank deposit rates  in 20 countries  (from worst to best)
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Source:  IMF IFS Statistics; Figure  4; Authors'  calculations.
25There is significant variation across  the  sample. Using a simple average,  returns
are 180 basis points lower than bank deposit rates.  However, four countries - Sweden,
Philippines, Korea and Japan - show returns that are more than 100  basis points higher
than deposit rates. Japan and Korea stand out with returns exceeding  deposit rates by 300
and  250 basis points  respectively.  We  should note  however, that  this  differential
evaporates  if the yield on t-bills is used  instead of bank deposit rates. Most of the sample
posted returns  well below the short-term interest rate.  In the worst cases, the funds
would have earned 400-1000  basis  points more per annum by keeping all of their money
in bank deposits.  Worse yet, workers in these countries were not compensated  for these
poor returns by lower risk; the volatility  of bank deposit  interest rates was the same as or
lower  than  the  volatility  of  pension fund  returns  (see Annex  1).  By  contrast,
compounded real returns in Chile's private pension funds outpaced bank deposit rates by
370 basis  points between 1982-1997  according  to Srinivas  and Yermo (1999).
Figure 6 suggests  that returns in most of our sample are not even as high as the
short-term returns that can be obtained in banks by individual  savers. In some cases,  the
returns are much worse.  But pension funds handle long term savings  that should be able
to earn higher returns in exchange  for lower liquidity.  Rather than the riskless  rate of
return on liquid assets, they should be able to  earn something closer to the economy's
long run return  on capital.  This could only be achieved  of course, if investments were
made in the private capital markets. In the last section we have already shown that this is
uncommon for publicly-managed  funds.
In  assessing  the  gap between actual and potential returns we can look to  the
growth of incomes as a rough benchmark. In a dynamically  efficient  economy,  returns to
capital are higher than the growth in incomes over long time horizons.  As shown by
Abel et. al., (1989),  this can be the case  even when the riskless  rate of return (e.g.,  interest
on  t-bills) is  below GDP  growth.  Thus, the  returns available to  publicly-managed
pension funds from a diversified  portfolio should be greater than income growth, other
things constant.  This relationship is also important if the pension scheme is to generate
reasonable  replacement  rates.
Figure 7 shows that only two publicly-managed  pension schemes  earned returns
that were greater than the growth of income per capita during the periods in question.
Only in the Philippines and Morocco were returns greater than income growth and then
only by a small margin. 32 In most countries, returns trailed income growth.  In half the
sample,  the differential  in favor of income growth was greater  than 300 basis  points.
The results for Singapore  and Malaysia  merit further discussion. Both provident
funds exhibit low but positive real rates of returns for their members. However, incomes
in both countries were among  the fastest  growing in the world over the last three decades.
Another similarity is that prescribed yields to  members have been based on short-term
32 It should be noted  that  as in all of the countries, our data refers to the main public scheme for
private  employees  - in  this  case the  SSS.  However,  a fund  of  similar  magnitude  for civil  servants
was also being  managed  during  this  period  and  returns  appear  to have  been  much  lower  there.
26interest rates while actual  investment returns are believed  to have been much higher. For
example, Asher (1998)  suggests  the actual investment return in Singapore  may have been
more than three percentage  points higher than what has been credited to their accounts.
In other words, part of the effect being observed here is an implicit taxation of returns
rather than poor investment  performance.
Figure 7 Difference between real annual compounded publicly-managed
pension fund returns and real income per capita growth in selected countries























-50%  40%  -30%  -20%  -1  0%  0%  10%
gross  returns  minus  income  per  capita
Source: IMF International  Finance Statistics; Authors'  calculations.
From the  worker's perspective, the  result  of this  implicit taxation  is  a  low
replacement rate.  Assuming  that average  wages  and income per capita moved in tandem
in both countries, a worker who began his career in 1960  would have seen his wage grow
eightfold  in  Singapore and  almost tenfold  in  Malaysia by  1995.  Meanwhile, the
27contribution he made in  1960 would only have doubled in  Singapore and tripled in
Malaysia. Not surprisingly,  criticism of these schemes has increased as workers about to
retire after contributing their entire working lives find that low balances are insufficient
to maintain pre-retirement  living standards. 33
Private pension fund returns  in  contrast, almost always exceed the  growth of
incomes over the long run.  Figure 8 below shows that this difference is usually at least
200  basis  points.  And although  the time periods considered  here differ, public and private
pension  returns over long periods of time can also be compared for a few countries.  For
example, privately-managed funds  in  Sweden and  Japan  earned  returns  that  were
respectively,  300 and 500  basis  points higher than their public sector counterparts.
Figure 8 Difference  between real  annual private pension fund returns
and the real income per capita  growth selected countries
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statistics.
33 See for example,  Asher  (1999) and  Leong  and  Das-Gupta  (1998) on  Singapore.
283.6 Underlying causes  of low returns in publicly-managed  schemes
In Figures 5 and 6, we ranked publicly-managed pension funds in our sample based
on  the  difference between  investment  returns  and  bank  deposits or  income  per  capita
growth.  The first measure served to crudely control  for broader policies and shocks that
would  affect most investments.  It also provided a benchmark  return that  was presumably
available to  all investors in the same country  during  the  same time period.  The second
measure focused on the gap between actual returns and the return that should be available
in the private  markets, i.e., a return  exceeding the  growth  of incomes.  In  both  cases, we
found  that  public  pension  fund  returns  fared badly;  in  some  cases, they  were  simply
disastrous.  We also noted that where  data are available, private pension  fund  returns  are
almost always greater than income growth.
The  direct  causes for  underperformance  have  already  been  mentioned:  They
include  government  interference  in investment  ranging from  the imposition  of social or
development  objectives on the pension  fund to  forcing pension funds to  finance deficits
or state enterprise  losses often at interest rates lower than what is available on the market.
The common  prohibition  on investment  abroad posed another  major challenge to public
pension  fund  managers trying to  diversify their  (often significant) country-specific  risk.
While  we noted that  thin  and/or  badly regulated capital markets might  not  provide  the
investment  opportunities  required  by  large  funds,  this  constraint  did  not  seem to  be
binding  in  most  countries.  It  certainly  could not  explain  why returns  were  lower  than
bank deposit rates.
We  also  noted  that  normalized  returns  vary  widely  across  publicly  managed
pension  funds.  This  suggests that  additional factors are either exacerbating  or mitigating
the  general deficiencies that affect public management.  The obvious question  is why  do
some countries perform better than others do?
Explaining  private  pension  fund  performance  has  focused  on  strategic  asset
allocation.  These  decisions have  been found  to  explain  more  than  90  percent  of the
variation  in risk adjusted returns  across private pension funds. 34 In public pension funds,
we  have  shown  that  these  decisions  are  largely  determined  by  the  mandates  and
restrictions  imposed  on  public  pension  fund  managers.  Asset allocation  decisions  are
largely  political  and  have  little  to  do  with  any  application  of  portfolio  theory.
Furthermore,  given that  public managers tend to  use criteria that  ignore  the  concept  of
risk adjusted return  and typically invest very little in private capital markets,  performance
is not likely to depend very much on the skill of internal  asset managers.
In  short,  the  problem  is that  investment  policy  is driven by  political  motives.
This  means  that  performance  differentials  observed  across  countries  are  most  likely
correlated  with  lack of transparency  that  allows  the  fund  to  be used  for  non-pension
purposes.  Other  characteristics would  also  reflect  the  quality  of  governance:  Some
4  See Brinson et. al., (1986)  and Brinson  et. al., (1991).
29governments  may  be less dependent  on  cheap borrowing  from  pension  reserves  while
others  may be more  resistant to  lobbies for  social investments.  Some  may be even be
more susceptible to corruption.
Recently,  good government  has been found to  be associated with  a wide array  of
positive development outcomes across many countries. 35 Conversely,  after accounting for
other  factors,  the  countries  that  rank  poorly  in  terms  of  bureaucratic  efficiency  and
corruption  are found  to have worse living standards.  In the  case of public  pension  fund
management, the link may be even more straightforward:
Based on the evidence, we are motivated to test the following hypotheses:
*  The level of governance in a country affects performance  across countries
*  There is a general "public management effect" that itself reduce returns
These  hypotheses  were  tested  in  a  multivariate  regression  analysis using  gross
returns  minus bank deposit rates as the dependent variable.  An index  of governance and
a  dummy  variable  for private  management  were  used  as independent  variables.  The
governance measure is an average of three indices covering surveyed perceptions  of (i) the
efficiency of the  judiciary system,  (ii) the amount  of  "red  tape"  and  (iii) corruption  as
found  in  Appendix  3  of  Mauro  (1995).  The  specific  proposition  here  is  that  poor
governance leads to  conditions - corruption,  politicized  investments,  the  need for captive
financing for deficits etc. -which in turn  lead to poor returns.
Several specifications were  attempted.  The sample used included  16 of the  multi-
year country  observations of gross returns  minus bank  deposit rates from  Figure  5.  The
governance index was not  available for the other  countries. 36 The  sample also included
observations of the same indicator  from  14 countries  for  which  private  pension  returns
were  available.  Observations  of both  public  and  private  management  were  used  from
Canada,  the  United  States,  Sweden  and  Japan.  An  intercept  dummy  for  private
management was included.
The functional  form  that  yielded  the  best fit was  quadratic,  suggesting that  the
impact  of governance  on  performance  is  greater  in  the  lower  part  of  the  range  and
gradually  levels  off.  Using  this  specification,  the  adjusted  R 2 was  .58.  Both  of  the
variables were statistically significant (at the five percent  level) and had the expected signs.
Better  country  governance  rankings  were  associated with  -higher  returns  while  public
management lowered them.
The extent  of these two  effects can be seen in  Figure  9 where  we plot  the fitted
lines for publicly and privately managed returns against different values of the governance
35  See  Kaufmann  et. al., (1999).
36  We ran a separate set of regressions with estimated values for four countries based on the
correlation between  Mauro's index  and  the  corruption  index  produced  by  Transparency
International. The regression  was more robust with these observations  included.
30index.  The effect of governance is strong: on  a scale of 1-10 with 10 being the best
governance,  an increase  from 4-5  to 8-10  increases  returns relative to bank deposits  by 5-7
percentage  points.  Most of the gains come at the lower part of this range and begin to
disappear  after a country achieves  a governance  rating of around 8.
Figure 9 Predicted normalized returns  for different levels of governance
for privately and publicly-managed schemes based on regression results
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Note:  Regression results used to  generate the figure are from the following equation 3":
-2.36 + .06151 * GOV7NDEX -.0038 * G0V7NDEX2 t  .0437 * PRIVATEDUM
(2.14)  (1.96)  (1.83)  (3.83)
t-stats  in parentheses;  adjusted  R2 = .58; number of observation = 30.
The difference between the  top  and the  bottom  lines in  Figure 8 is due to  the
significant  and  positive  coefficient  of  the  private  management  dummy.  This  is  an
intercept  dummy.  (A  slope  dummy  was  found  to  be  insignificant.)  According  to  our
results, private management produces returns  that  are about 430 basis points higher than
publicly-managed schemes after taking  into  account  differences in the governance index.
In other  words,  the  "public  management  effect"  is strongly  negative  as expected.
When  the  two  effects  shown  in  Figure  8  are  combined,  several  tentative
conclusions can be  drawn:  First,  based  on  the  experience  to  date, publicly-managed
schemes  are  likely  to  perform  very  badly  in  countries  with  low  governance  ratings.
Countries  with  good  governments  fare  better  but  are  unlikely  to  outperform  short  term
37  An interactive term was tested and found not to be significant.
31interest rates. This presents a major policy dilemma for countries  that choose to partially
fund  their  defined benefit obligations in  the  hope  of  improving sustainability and
stabilizing payroll taxes in the face of population aging. It is an even greater problem for
countries that  choose to  run  centrally managed defined contribution  schemes where
benefits depend directly on the investment return.
Second,  Figure 9 shows that privately-managed  schemes  are likely to outperform
short  term interest rates in  countries with  medium or  high governance ratings.  In
countries rated 7 or  better, private returns exceed bank deposit rates by more than 400
basis  points.  On the other hand, countries with the worst governance  ratings, say below
4, would not produce reasonable returns even with private management. The difference
between normalized returns  in  a privately-managed  scheme in  a country  with  good
government and a publicly-managed  scheme in a poorly governed  country would be on
the order of 10  percentage points.
The policy implications are significant: First, unless public management can be
improved, it is not likely to be effective  in achieving  the objectives  of either a partially
funded DB or a funded DC  scheme.  Second, poor performance of publicly-managed
schemes is likely to  signal misallocation of  savings with  important  macroeconomic
implications if the fund itself is large. Third, privately managed  schemes  tend to produce
gross returns that are consistent with the objectives of pension policy but only where a
certain level of governance has been attained. Finally, poorly governed  countries should
probably avoid funding their mandatory pension systems  altogether. 38 .
There are several important  caveats however.  First, this analysis ignores risk.
This would not affect the story for countries in the low governance  category where poor
returns are also very volatile (see Figure 5).  However, in the well-governed  countries,
adjusting the publicly-managed  scheme returns for risk would reduce the advantage  to
private management and increase the importance of good governance  in our regression.
At the same time, it is not clear that annual volatility is the appropriate measure of risk
for  these  long  term  savings vehicles.  Considering longer periods  favors private
management.
The data set used suffers from certain problems of quality and comparability
already highlighted. Also, the sample is quite small despite  the fact that the 30 country
observations represent  more  than  400 country/year  data points  for  each variable.
Unfortunately, time series  data on governance  is not readily available. The cross section
regression  implicitly,  assumes  that relative governance capacity  has not changed over the
time periods analyzed.
38  A possible  criterion  would  be the governance  level  at which  the regression  would  predict  that
returns  would  be greater  than bank deposit  rates. Based  on Mauro  (1995),  the following  countries
would not achieve  this standard: Bangladesh,  Egypt, Ghana, Haiti, Indonesia,  Iran, Liberia,
Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Thailand,  and  Zaire.
32Our results are also likely to be skewed by the  fact that the  privately-managed
schemes in our sample are from countries with better governance. In future work, we
hope to  expand the  overall sample and especially  the available  information on private
pension funds in  low governance countries.  Finally, it should also be noted that the
privately-managed returns are sectoral averages  hiding potentially significant variation
across funds within a country.
Nevertheless, the preliminary conclusions  of the analysis  are quite robust and are
consistent with a large body of anecdotal  evidence.
3.7  Direct effect  ofpoor management  of  public  pension  reserves
The portfolios of publicly-managed  pension  funds tend to fall into two categories  -
high proportions of government or government-guaranteed  debt and bank deposits or a
combination of these with socially and economically  targeted investments. With a few
exceptions, very little is invested in private securities and foreign investment is almost
never observed.  These practices produce several  problems for members of the pension
fund and for the economy as a whole.
The most visible consequence for the members of the  fund is the  low rate of
return.  For partially funded DB schemes,  low returns hasten the day when benefits must
be cut or contributions raised. This has already happened in many developing  countries
where deficits have arisen or contribution rate increases  have  been forced after just one or
two decades of operation largely due to poor investment returns.  In other words, poor
investment policy leads to a lower internal rate of return to participation in the scheme.
The return could even be lower than the hypothetical  return possible  under a pure pay-as-
you-go financing arrangement, namely the growth of the covered  wage  bill.
The members of a publicly-run DC scheme  feel the effects  much more directly.
A worker that  contributed 100 shillings to the Kenyan provident fund in 1978 would
have retired in  1990 with  about 60 shillings in real terms.  And even where the real
returns are positive, the fact that they do not keep  up with the growth of incomes means
that their  consumption smoothing function is compromised.  As shown in Figure 10
below, a contribution of 20 percent of wage  with a return that exceeds  wage  growth by 2
percentage points can produce a hypothetical indexed  annuity of around 60 percent while
a return one percentage point below wage growth would produce a replacement  rate of
only 30 percent.
Figure 10 uses parameters  for the annuity calculation  based  on the Sri Lankan case.
In  fact, the actual growth of income in Sri Lanka was more than 3 percentage points
higher than the  return  on the  Employees  Provident Fund investments.  This type of
return differential means that very significant  contribution rates cannot hope to produce
reasonable  replacement  rates.
33Figure  10  Hypothetical  annuity  produced by a 20 percent  contribution  for a full
career  worker  in  Sri Lanka according  to investment  return/wage  growth  differential
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Note:  Calculations  based  on  hypothetical  inflation  adjusted  annuity  after  37  years  of
contributions  using current life expectancy at age 60 in Sri Lanka.
Low  returns  over  long  periods  of  time  as in  Sri  Lanka  can  gradually  erode  the
credibility  of  the  system.  To  the  extent  that  workers  increasingly  perceive  the  lost
returns  as a tax,  they  will be encouraged  to evade  the  scheme  and hide  their  income  from
the  government.  An  extreme  case  of this  phenomenon  occurred  recently  in  the  small
island  nation  of Vanuatu.  In February  of 1999, workers  voted  with  their  feet.  Australian
press  reported  the  following  story:
"Over  two-thousand  members  of the  National  Provident  Fund  have  received  their
contribution  payments totaling  just over two-million  dollars.  The Fund's  acting general
manager,  Joses Kenneth  says the  fund  is processing  a  daily  payment  of  40-thousand
dollars to some 500 members.  The decision to payout the money  was reached after riots
broke  out in Port Vila last month  when worried depositors stormed the fund's head office
which the Ombudsman said gave preferential loans to politicians and their  supporters."
343.8 Public management of pension reserves  and savings
The relationship  between public pension  systems and  national savings is complex
and a vast literature  exists on the  subject.  One  specific question  is directly  relevant to
public  management  of pension  reserves.  This  is the  question  of  how  fiscal policy  is
affected by the presence of pension  surpluses.  There  is some evidence for example, that
forced purchase of  government  debt  may  lead to  increased  government  consumption.
Cogan  (1998) provides  econometric  evidence of such an  effect in the United  States and
Von Furstenberg  (1979) finds that  spending  at the provincial  level increased  due to  the
subsidized credit provided by the Canadian Pension Plan.
Unfortunately,  evidence is  scarce, but  the  idea  that  easy access to  these  funds
increases the  government's  appetite  for  spending  seems  a reasonable  hypothesis.  (The
effect is made more  likely by the fiscal accounting methods  that  consider public pension
fund government  bond  holdings  as repurchase of government  debt as is the case in the
IMF's  Government  Finance  Statistics  framework.)  If  such  an  effect  does  exist,  the
rationale  for  prefunding  must  be  seriously  undermined.  In  the  extreme  case where
borrowing  increases exactly in step with the surpluses, the  "funded"  scheme would  have
the same intertemporal  economic impact as a pure pay-as-you-go scheme.  A similar result
could  be  obtained  by  maintaining  pay-as-you-go financing  but  simply  reporting  the
liabilities as part of the fiscal accounts. 39
How likely is it that  non-pension  government  spending  increases (or non-pension
taxes are reduced) in such a way  as to  completely  offset pension  surpluses?  The  answer
depends  to  some  extent  on  the  government's  target  budget  deficit  concept.  Most
governments focus on a deficit concept that  includes the central budget as well as pension
spending  and  revenues.'4  These  "headline"  deficits  may  not  accurately  reflect  the
intertemporal fiscal stance of the  government  but  are nevertheless  often  at the center  of
the annual budget discussions.
This important  point was made by a number of prominent  economists  analyzing
the  emerging surpluses  of  the  US  Social Security  program  in  the  late  1980s.4'  The
question addressed was whether  these surpluses were likely  to  add to  national  savings, a
key underlying assumption  of the  commission that raised contribution  rates in the early
1980s in  order  to  generate surpluses.  One  of the  analysts  was James  Buchanan  who
described the  scenario  in  which  a  comprehensive  deficit  target  is used  but  the  public
pension program is running  surpluses as follows:
39  See  Kane  and Palacios  (1996)  for a discussion  of reporting the implicit pension debt.
40  Munnell and Ernsberger (1989)  claim that the Swedish government is an exception in that
targets  exclude  the AP fund surpluses.
W'  weaver  (1990).
35"...suppose  that  the  comprehensive budget was in  deficit...  but  that  medium range
legislative  targets  were established  to reduce and then eliminate  the comprehensive  budget
deficit...  In this case, surpluses  in the social security account allow the deficit reduction
targets to be satisfied,  while still allowing for increases in the non-social  security  deficit.
Much the same  results emerge under any scheme for deficit control that uses balance  or
imbalance  in the comprehensive  budget as a criterion for policy achievement. As a final
example,  suppose that a decision  is made to keep the relationship between  the measured
comprehensive  budget  deficit  and the gross  national product constant. Again,  satisfaction
of this norm would allow  non-social-security  deficits to increase during the period of trust
fund accumulation.  "42
The consequences are straightforward:  If the  additional  spending induced by the
availability of these surpluses takes the form  of government  consumption,  'there will be
no induced increase in the rate of private  capital formation  in the economy.  There will
be no direct or indirect  funding of the  future pension  obligations'.  In other words,  as
long as governments focus on targets based on the standard definition of its budget deficit,
the intergenerational fiscal burden does not  improve through  this type of prefunding.
42  Buchanan (1 990).
43  Ibid.
364.  Summary  and conclusions
Part I of this paper reviewed some of the  available information  on  how publicly-
managed pension funds invest and how  their  returns  compare  to  relevant  benchmarks.
The general finding is that public pension  funds are subject to  a series of restrictions  and
mandates  that  produce  poor  returns.  The  non-pension  objectives  of  the  government
often  lead  to  social  and  economically  targeted  investments  and  forced  loans  to  the
government to finance its deficits.  These investments  yield returns  that  are often below
bank  deposit rates and almost always below the growth of incomes.  This  contrasts with
privately-managed pension  fund  returns,  which  generally exceed income  growth.  The
worst  returns are produced  by publicly-management  in countries  with  poor  governance
records.
The  low rates of return  found  in many  publicly-managed  schemes over  the  last
few decades have direct  and indirect negative consequences.  Direct  consequences are felt
by members of partially funded schemes that  must pay higher  contributions  during their
lifetimes  or  receive lower  benefits.  For  provident  fund  members  poor  returns  (or
prescribed  yields) directly  reduce  their  retirement  savings  and  make  it  impossible  to
maintain pre-retirement  consumption  levels.
Indirectly,  the  presence  of  these  reserves  may  lead  to  higher  non-pension
government  deficits if target deficit levels are based on the consolidated  budget.  Also, the
diversion of an important  pool of long term  savings to  projects  with  low  returns  or  for
higher government consumption implies an important  opportunity  cost for the economy.
Private capital markets  are robbed  of liquidity  and good projects  do not  find  financing.
The larger the fund relative to the capital markets the greater is this cost.
There is considerable evidence that public management of pension  funds should be
avoided.  But a number  of caveats were mentioned and further  research is clearly needed.
It  should  also be noted  that  Part  I has focused on the  past.  Therefore,  the  discussion
ignores  recent  policy  initiatives  in  some  countries  that  may  remedy  some  historical
problems  with  public  management.  Faced  with  demographic  aging  and  scheme
maturation,  some publicly-managed funds are starting to invest more of their  portfolio  in
the private  capital markets.  This trend  is likely to  continue,  raising a new  set of policy
issues. In particular, as public pension funds become shareholders in private  industry,  the
government  faces a  potential  conflict  between  its  role  as  regulator  and  its  role  in
corporate  governance.  Part  II of this  study reviews current  reform  proposals  in  several
OECD  countries and looks at possible ways of improving public management  of pension
reserves.
37Annex  1  Summary tables for data used in Figures 4-8
Compounded  real annual pension  fund  returns,  standard  deviation  and Sharpe  Ratio
(Rankedfrom  highest to lowest average return)
Country  Period  Compounded  Standard  Sharpe
Return  deviation  Ratio
Korea  1988-97  5.4%  1.4%  3.83
Malaysia  1958-96  3.2%  3.1%  1.05
Morocco  1985-96  2.3%  2.7%  0.85
Sweden  1961-95  2.1%  3.4%  0.60
US  1955-96  2.0%  3.4%  0.58
Canada  1971-89  1.8%  3.8%  0.48
India  1977-97  1.6%  2.7%  0.57
Singapore  1961-95  1.5%  - 4.2%  0.36
Japan  1970-94  1.4%  5.0%  0.27
Philippines  1978-91  0.8%  11.7%  0.07
Sri Lanka  1960-97  -0.3%  4.5%  -0.08
Kenya  1978-90  -3.9%  5.1%  -0.76
Jamaica  1979-86  -4.5%  7.5%  -0.60
Guatemala  1985-95  -4.9%  10.4%  -0.47
Costa Rica  1980-96  -5.0%  15.5%  -0.32
Egypt  1981-95  -9.1%  4.9%  -1.85
Ecuador  1980-87  -9.3%  8.8%  -1.06
Tanzania  1986-96  -11.2%  5.2%  -2.14
Venezuela  1979-89  -15.3%  21.0%  -0.73
Zambia  1980-91  -28.5%  18.7%  -1.52
Uganda  1986-94  -33.1%  25.6%  -1.29
Peru  1981-87  -44.0%  25.7%  -1.71
Unweighted Average  -6.7%  8.8%  -17.5%
Maximum  5.4%  25.7%
Minimum  -44.0%  1.4%
Total observations  325
(country x years)
38Compounded real annual real bank deposit rates and standard deviation
Country  Period  Compounded  Standard
Return  deviation
Canada  1975-89  2.6%  2.5%
Costa Rica  1982-96  -2.3%  11.7%
Ecuador  1980-87  -5.6%  6.7%
Egypt  1981-95  -3.7%  3.5%
Guatemala  1985-95  -1.9%  5.2%
India  1977-97  1.3%  3.3%
Jamaica  1979-86  -4.3%  7.5%
Japan  1970-94  -1.6%  4.3%
Kenya  1978-90  -1.3%  5.0%
Korea  1988-97  2.9%  1.2%
Malaysia  1958-96  3.0%  2.8%
Morocco  1985-96  2.5%  2.1%
Peru  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Philippines  1978-91  -0.4%  7.1%
Singapore  1972-95  1.1%  3.6%
Sri Lanka  1978-97  2.8%  5.1%
Sweden  1962-95  0.9%  2.5%
Tanzania  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Uganda  1986-94  -22.7%  27.3%
US  1960-96  1.7%  2.4%
Venezuela  1982-89  -8.6%  13.1%
Zambia  1980-90  -18.4%  15.4%
Unweighted  Average  -2.6%  6.2%
Maximum  3.0%  27.3%
Minimum  -22.7%  1.2%
39Compounded real annual income per capita growth and standard deviation
Country  Period  Compounded  Standard
Return  deviation
Canada  1971-89  2.9%  2.6%
Costa Rica  1980-96  2.2%  5.8%
Ecuador  1980-87  -0.3%  3.8%
Egypt  1981-95  2.3%  2.9%
Guatemala  1985-95  0.5%  1.6%
India  1977-97  3.3%  3.2%
Jamaica  1979-86  -2.1%  4.7%
Japan  1970-94  3.2%  3.6%
Kenya  1978-90  1.0%  5.1%
Korea  1988-97  7.4%  3.3%
Malaysia  1961-96  4.3%  2.7%
Morocco  1985-96  1.7%  4.7%
Peru  1981-87  -1.6%  3.3%
Philippines  1978-91  -0.2%  3.2%
Singapore  1961-95  6.2%  3.8%
Sri Lanka  1960-97  3.4%  4.5%
Sweden  1961-95  2.5%  2.2%
Tanzania  1986-96  -0.4%  4.5%
Uganda  1986-94  2.3%  3.4%
United States  1955-96  1.8%  2.1%
Venezuela  1979-89  -0.4%  4.0%
Zambia  1980-91  -1.9%  4.8%




















Hong Kong  9.25











Costa Rica  6.4
Guatemala  4.2
1/ Taken from Appendix 3, Mauro (1995).
2/ Based on Transparency International Corruption index.
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Many  pension  schemes  mandated  by  governments  have  accumulated
large  reserves.  The  management  of these  funds  has  a direct  effect  on
financial  sustainability  and  potential  benefit  levels.  It  also  has  important
indirect  effects  on the  overall  economy  when  the  funds  are  large.  Part
I of this  study  surveys  some  of  the available  cross-country  evidence
on publicly-managed  pension  reserves.  We  find  that  publicly-managed
pension  funds  (i) are  often  used  to achieve  objectives  other  than
providing  pensions  (ii)  are  difficultto  insulate  from  political  interference
and  (iii) tend  to earn  poor  rates  of return  relative  to relevant  indices.
These  findings  are  consistent  across  countries  of all types,  but returns
are  especially  dismal  in countries  with  poor  governance.  The  experience
to date  suggests  that  the rationale  for prefunding  have  been  seriously
undermined  by public management  of pension reserves.  Countries
with serious  governance  problems  should  probably
avoid funding altogether.
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